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Bottom Up justification, asymmetric epistemic push, and the fragility of higher 
order justification 
Forthcoming in Episteme, 2017 
 
Abstract 
When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect 
the epistemic justification of a higher order belief that this is the case? In an 
influential paper, Kelly argues that first order evidential accuracy tends to 
generate more justified higher order beliefs (Kelly 2010). Call this Bottom Up. I 
argue that neither general views about what justifies our higher order beliefs nor 
the specific arguments that Kelly offers support Bottom Up. Second, I suggest that 
while we can reject Bottom Up, we can still accept that justified higher order 
beliefs significantly affect the justification of first order beliefs. Third, I argue that 
the epistemic justification of higher order belief is fragile in the sense that it tends 
to dissipate when a subject is confronted with certain defeaters, including notably 
the sort of defeaters arising from disagreement, precisely when higher order 
justification depends on first order success in the ways that one may think support 
Bottom Up.  
1. Introduction 
Suppose that my object level belief accurately reflects the strength of the evidence 
available to me: my evidence e warrants credence n in a proposition p, and upon 
                                                      
  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops in Leuven, 
Cologne and Copenhagen. Thanks to audiences for helpful comments, in particular 
Chris Kelp, Thomas Grundmann, Jon Matheson, David Christensen, Mikkel Gerken, 
Bjørn Hallsson, Emil Moeller, Frederik Andersen, Giacomo Melis, Fernando 
Broncano-Berrocal, and Josefine Pallavicini. Thanks to an anonymous referees for 
Episteme for no less than two sets of detailed and helpful comments to earlier 
drafts. 
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appreciating the evidence accurately I believe p with just that credence. Am I then 
justified in my higher order belief that my object level belief correctly reflects the 
evidence? Conversely, suppose that I got it wrong at the object level; I accord some 
proposition higher or lower credence than the evidence actually warrants. Does 
this render my higher order belief (that I did get it right) less epistemically 
justified? In an influential paper in the epistemology of disagreement, Kelly argues 
that first order evidential accuracy tends to bring about higher order justification 
(Kelly 2010):  
 
'... when one correctly responds to a body of evidence, one is typically 
better justified in thinking that one has responded correctly than one 
is when one responds incorrectly' (156).  
 
And similarly:  
 
'... when E is genuinely good evidence for H, this very fact will 
contribute to the justification for believing the epistemic proposition 
that E is good evidence for H that is available for those with the 
relevant competence.' (159). 
 
For convenience, I will refer to this view as Bottom Up, though Kelly does not use 
that term.1 Roughly, Bottom Up asserts that appreciating first order evidence 
                                                      
1  Titelbaum uses 'bottom-up' for the view that when some first order 
belief is rationally impermissible, then 'no amount of testimony, training, or 
putative evidence about what’s rational can change what is rationally permitted or 
what the agent is rationally permitted to believe about it' (Titelbaum 2013, 279). 
In the same paper he asks 'How is the justificatory map arranged such that one is 
never all-things-considered justified in both an attitude A and the belief that A is 
rationally forbidden in one’s current situation?'. The most obvious answer, 
Titelbaum suggests, is that 'every agent possesses a priori, propositional 
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accurately tends to make one epistemically justified in believing the epistemic 
proposition expressing what one's evidence is evidence for, and in believing that 
one has indeed responded correctly to one's first order evidence. Bottom Up also 
asserts that misapprehension of evidence does not contribute to higher order 
justification in similar ways. So, accuracy at the first order level makes a distinct 
difference to higher order justification.  
 The complement to Bottom Up is the more familiar idea that being 
justified in believing that there is something epistemically amiss with one's first 
order belief should make one less justified in that belief. I will call the view that 
there is this connection running from higher order belief to first order belief Top 
Down, and will say a bit more about it below. 
 Bottom Up is quite important for a particular argument in the 
epistemology of disagreement. Suppose that you and I know one another to be 
approximate epistemic peers looking at the same body of evidence. I now realize 
that we disagree. It strongly seems to me that p, whereas you are confident that p 
is false. Suppose that, in fact, I got it right: my belief correctly reflects the evidence, 
and you are wrong in your assessment of the evidence. As Kelly points out, it is 
tempting to think that though there is an asymmetry at the object level, you and I 
are even at the higher order level. Assuming that we both believe that we 
appreciate the first order evidence correctly, these higher order beliefs are equally 
justified. If this were true, then, as Kelly notes, 'it would be unreasonable to favor 
                                                                                                                                                            
justification for true beliefs about the requirements of rationality in her current 
situation. An agent can reflect on her situation and come to recognize facts about 
what that situation rationally requires. Not only can this reflection justify her in 
believing those facts; the resulting justification is also empirically indefeasible." 
(Titelbaum 2013, 276).  This view is related to what I call Bottom Up. Titelbaum 
defends this as a part of his general view on akratic conflicts, and does not offer 
details about how a priori propositional justification may come about by reflection 
on first order evidence, or why it would be empirically indefeasible. A discussion of 
Titelbaum's interesting views is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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one's own belief over the belief of one's peer' (155), despite the asymmetry at the 
object level. So, the argument goes, since we are equally justified in our higher 
order beliefs, you and I should accord equal weight to the first order credences 
involved in our disagreement, which in turn is a strong consideration in favor of 
the Equal Weight View. Kelly claims that this argument for the Equal Weight View 
fails, because 'Asymmetry at the lower level tends to create an asymmetry at the 
higher level, an asymmetry that otherwise would not have existed' (160). So, 
according to Kelly, the above argument for the Equal Weight View is blocked if 
Bottom Up is true, as this view implies that evidential asymmetries at the object 
level generate asymmetries at the higher level.  
 Actually, Bottom Up is important not only for the epistemology of 
disagreement, but for a wider question concerning how first order evidence and 
higher order evidence should be integrated. Consider a case of epistemic akrasia, 
that is, a case where a subject S rationally believes p on some evidence e, but also 
rationally believes that there is no good evidence for believing p. Until fairly 
recently, most epistemologists thought that S ought to integrate her beliefs, by 
adjusting her credence in her first order belief, or in her higher order belief, or 
both to avoid such conflicts. Borrowing a label from (Christensen 2007), I call this 
view Integration. As I understand Integration, all it says is that object level and 
higher-level belief must somehow be aligned. Integration is open to both Bottom 
Up and to Top Down, but could also accept one without the other, or could maybe 
even deny both and suggest a different way of aligning the levels. It should be 
noted that Integration is far from uncontroversial. Indeed, in recent literature a 
number of contributors have questioned Integration or specific versions of it, see 
for example (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; Weatherson Ms). Others have defended 
certain versions of it, see in particular (Sliwa and Horowitz 2015; Horowitz 2014).2  
 My discussion concerns the details of Integration. According to Top 
Down, justified higher order beliefs affect the justification or rational credence of 
                                                      
2  For further views on akratic conflicts, see see (Titelbaum 2013; 
Christensen 2013; Worsnip 2015) 
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first order belief. But according to Bottom Up, first order success may directly 
affect the level of justification of certain higher order belief. As will emerge below, 
one can accept Bottom Up, while rejecting Top Down, or conversely, just as one 
can, of course, accept both Top Down and Bottom Up, and thus hold that the 
direction of influence goes both ways. Finally, one can reject both views. How we 
understand the interactions between first order belief and evidence and higher 
order belief and evidence is decisive for how we should understand Integration. 
 In this paper I will argue for three main claims. First, I discuss a 
number of different arguments for Bottom Up - some derived from Kelly's work, 
others not - and argue that it is on the whole difficult to find compelling arguments 
for significant versions of Bottom Up (section 3). Second, I suggest that while we 
can reject Bottom Up, we can still accept the Top Down view that justified higher 
order beliefs significantly affect the justification of first order beliefs, and I 
elaborate on this peculiar asymmetry in direction of influence (section 4). Third, I 
argue that the epistemic justification of higher order belief is fragile in the sense 
that it tends to dissipate when a subject is confronted with certain defeaters, 
including the sort of defeaters arising from disagreement, exactly when higher 
order justification depends on first order success in the ways that one may think 
support Bottom Up. By contrast, when the justification of higher order belief 
depends on other sources, it is not as fragile, though this varies as a function of the 
source of justification (section 5). In section 6, I provide some concluding remarks. 
2. Higher Order Beliefs and Bottom Up 
We first need some preliminary remarks about higher order beliefs and Bottom 
Up. Here I consider epistemic higher order beliefs, that is, beliefs about 
epistemically relevant features of object level beliefs, though I will continue to 
simply refer to these as higher order beliefs. We might think of higher order beliefs 
in a variety of ways. One significant kind of higher order belief involves epistemic 
propositions. An epistemic proposition is a proposition that some body of evidence 
e warrants a particular doxastic attitude, for example full belief in a proposition or 
credence n in a certain proposition. For the most part I will for convenience use '<e 
warrants p to degree n>' to refer to epistemic propositions, but none of the 
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arguments I discuss depend on the fine-grainedness or the nature of epistemic 
propositions that this suggests. One could instead run the arguments in terms of 
epistemic propositions of the form <e warrants full belief in p>. 
 Suppose that S believes the epistemic proposition <e warrants p to 
degree n>, and that this proposition is true. Yet, for S to evaluate her own object 
level belief in p, it is clearly not enough that S believes this proposition. S must also 
believe that her first order belief in p is held with some credence or other so that 
she can assess whether her object level belief correctly reflects the epistemic 
proposition. Obviously, higher order beliefs need not be this complicated, and 
typically they are not. S may have a higher order belief that a first order belief has a 
particular desirable epistemic property, for example, that it is epistemically 
justified, or known. Or S may simply believe of a first order belief that it correctly 
reflects the evidence available to S, whatever level of credence that requires. 
 Return now to Bottom Up. The rough idea is that assessing the first 
order evidence correctly contributes in a distinct way to the justification of higher 
order beliefs, whereas misinterpreting evidence at the object level does not. 
Bottom Up does not, of course, assert that object level beliefs are always 
accompanied by higher order beliefs. Bottom Up only claims that when object level 
beliefs accurately reflect first order evidence, a subject is thereby in a position to 
form a highly justified positive higher order belief, whereas this is not the case 
when a subject misjudges evidence. 
 It is important to note that Bottom Up does not assert that there is a 
direct link between having strong evidence for object level belief and a high level of 
justification of higher order belief. Rather, what influences justification of higher 
order belief, is the proper appreciation of evidence at the first order level, be the 
evidence strong or not. Kelly concurs to this in the first of his remarks quoted 
above, though not in the second, where he seems to assert that strong first order 
evidence itself contributes to higher order justification. Clearly, however, we need 
the stricter second reading of Bottom Up. Suppose that Albert and Bertrand face 
the same evidence e pertaining to a proposition p, and Albert correctly grasps the 
evidential import of e, whereas Bertrand does not. In this case, the proponent of 
Bottom Up would want to say that Albert's higher order beliefs are more justified 
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than Bertrand's. The difference between them is due to differences in the accuracy 
at the first order level, not due to difference in strength of their evidence, as this is 
the same. It might often be true, however, that when some body of first order 
evidence is genuinely good evidence for a proposition, then it is easier to 
appreciate the force of the evidence correctly, and this would tend to yield a link 
between having good evidence at the first order and being more justified in one's 
higher order beliefs. But still, the decisive association is between first order 
accuracy and higher order justification, not between the strength of first order 
evidence as such and higher order justification.   
3. Why we should not accept Bottom Up 
In this section I argue that we should not accept Bottom Up. First, I consider the 
some obvious sources of justification for higher order beliefs and argue that they 
do not support Bottom Up. Next, I turn to Kelly's specific arguments for Bottom Up, 
and argue that they fail.  
 The most obvious source of justification for higher order beliefs is 
what we might call track record evidence. One form of track record evidence is 
generated by our justified expectations about our cognitive system. We may 
reasonably assume that our cognitive system works well under normal 
circumstances, and that under those conditions it generally leads us to accept 
beliefs that arise as proper responses to the evidence. 3 If we can reasonably 
assume that our circumstances are indeed normal, then we have some evidence for 
thinking that our first order beliefs properly reflect the evidence.  
 Track record evidence hardly supports Bottom Up, however. The 
problem is that the strength of track record evidence is independent of evidential 
accuracy or other epistemic qualities of the particular object level beliefs that they 
                                                      
3  One can surely question the truth of the crucial premise as there is 
plenty of evidence indicating that we are subject to many forms of biases that 
incline us to misinterpret or neglect evidence, and that this is how our cognitive 
system works under normal circumstances. I will set this complication aside.  
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concern. Consider two cases that only differ by the quality of a subject's response 
to first order evidence. In one case, Albert responds properly to first order 
evidence. In an otherwise identical case, Bertrand mistakes the force of the first 
order evidence. The track record evidence available to Albert and Bertrand is 
exactly similar, and thus licenses equal degrees of justification of their respective 
higher order beliefs. So, the justification of higher order beliefs provided by this 
form of track record evidence does not underwrite Bottom Up.  
 It might be thought that there are other features that tend to make 
higher order beliefs justified. One idea mentioned in passing by Kelly is that when 
object level beliefs accurately reflect the evidence this is typically not due to mere 
chance, but due to cognitive faculties that generally produce accurate assessments 
of the evidence.4 One may wonder, however, how much this does for the 
plausibility of Bottom Up. Even if object level beliefs generally reflects the evidence 
in non-accidental ways, this does not show that higher order beliefs tracks first 
order evidential success in any way relevant for the justification of higher order 
beliefs. In reply to this, it may be said that this only shows only that higher order 
beliefs do not necessarily track first order accuracy. It could still be the case that 
higher order beliefs track first order accuracy well enough.5 Let us now consider 
this possibility. Generally, when we confidently believe a proposition on the basis 
of some evidence, we are strongly inclined to believe that our object level belief is a 
proper response to the evidence. Otherwise we would, on reflection, revise our 
object level belief, or be subject to an irrational form of cognitive dissonance. 
There is, however, a reason to doubt that this disposition to form positive higher 
order beliefs typically serves to make higher order beliefs highly justified. The 
                                                      
4  Cf. Kelly's remark: 'in paradigmatic cases in which one takes up the 
view that is best supported by one's evidence, it is no mere accident that one has 
done so (although lucky accidents are of course possible, they are atypical). Rather, 
one takes up the belief in question precisely because it is supported by one's 
evidence' (156).  
5  Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this. 
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reason is that this disposition tracks first order confidence, not actual accuracy. So, 
normal subjects would, when prompted, form such positive higher order beliefs 
about any confidently held object level belief, even in cases where object level 
processes fail in ways that are not discernible to them.  
 In response, one might point out that for all this, we might be 
reasonable good at tracking first order accuracy in virtue of being very good at 
tracking a proxy for first order accuracy, namely first order confidence. If true, this 
might generate some level of justification of higher order belief. It is doubtful, 
however, if this will support Bottom Up. Suppose that Anton and Bertrand are 
equally good though imperfect trackers of first order accuracy in virtue of tracking 
confidence as a proxy for first order accuracy, and that this is how their higher 
order beliefs get their justification. Suppose now that in a particular case, Anton 
responds accurately to a certain body of first order evidence, while Bertrand does 
not. They both equally confidently believe that their first order belief is accurate. If 
their higher order justification derives from their capacity to track first order 
success, then since this capacity is the same for both, their higher order beliefs will 
be equally justified. Accordingly, this view does not support Bottom Up.  
3.1 The Argument from Recognition 
The above review of some obvious sources of justification for higher order beliefs 
does not suggest that Bottom Up should be plausible. So, let us now consider 
Kelly's main argument for thinking that Bottom Up holds. Kelly writes:  
 
'Indeed, in a given case, one might very well take up the belief because 
one recognizes that this is what one's evidence supports. Plausibly, 
recognizing that p entails knowing that p. Assuming that that is so, 
then any case in which one recognizes that one's evidence supports a 
given belief is a case in which one knows that one's evidence supports 
that belief. Clearly, if one knows that one's evidence supports a given 
belief, then one is justified in thinking that one's evidence supports 
that belief; if one were not justified, one would not know. But, even if 
recognizing that p does not entail knowing that p, one would in any 
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case not be able to recognize that p if one were unjustified in thinking 
that p. It follows immediately from this that, whenever one recognizes 
that one's evidence supports such-and-such a conclusion, one is 
justified in thinking that one's evidence supports that conclusion' 
(156).  
 
Call this The Argument from Recognition. The argument can be spelled out in the 
following way (for simplicity I omit modifiers that Kelly may want to add that this 
holds only in some cases, not all cases):  
 
 (i) When S responds correctly to evidence e by forming credence n in 
p, then S recognizes that <e supports p to degree n>.  
 
(ii) Recognizing a proposition entails knowing the truth of that 
proposition. 
 
(iii) So, when S responds correctly to evidence e, S knows the truth of 
the epistemic proposition that <e supports p to degree n>. 
 
Of course, knowing the truth of an epistemic proposition is a significant case of 
having a highly justified higher order belief, and S will have this highly justified 
higher order belief in virtue of having responded correctly to the first order 
evidence. So, if (iii) is correct a noteworthy version of Bottom Up holds.  
 An initial worry about the Argument from Recognition is that is not 
obvious why responding properly to a body of evidence should be construed as 
involving entertaining an epistemic proposition. Think for example about cases in 
which we routinely and with no great effort respond correctly to some body of 
evidence, yet in which we cannot explain to ourselves what evidence we have 
actually responded to. Why think that appreciating evidence and responding by 
forming a belief involve entertaining epistemic propositions? This question is 
difficult to settle, however, as much will depend on what we think is involved in 
entertaining a proposition. 
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 Setting this aside, suppose that appreciating evidence involves 
entertaining epistemic propositions. Then why think that a demanding epistemic 
state such as knowing is required? As we have seen, Kelly asserts that responding 
correctly to evidence involves recognizing a proposition and that recognizing 
entails knowing, as asserted in premise (ii). Kelly doesn't offer a distinct argument 
for these claims, but simply assumes that 'recognize' takes a propositional 
complement, and he also assumes a success-dependent use of 'recognize' 
according to which S recognizes the truth of p only if S knows that p is true. 
Certainly, there are uses of 'recognize' that conform to this. The question, however, 
is whether this particular use of the verb 'recognize' is appropriate for what 
normally goes on when we appreciate evidence at first order level, even in cases 
where we correctly and confidently respond to evidence. Whether this is so is a 
substantial philosophical question, and it cannot be settled simply by a choice of 
word for the relation. Kelly offers no independent argument to substantiate why 
'recognize' as it is employed in the argument is the proper way to describe what 
normally happens in the kind of phenomenon we are trying to understand.  
 Independently of this, there are reasons to worry about the idea that 
correctly grasping the evidential import of some body of evidence e involves 
knowing the truth of an evidential proposition such as <e supports p to degree n>. 
Knowing on the basis of what evidence, one may ask? One idea would be that to 
fully grasp of the evidential import of e, one needs independent evidence of the 
truth of <e supports p to degree n> strong enough for knowing this proposition. 
Apart from being independently questionable, we should note that this would not 
support Bottom Up, as it does not show assert a link between grasping first order 
evidence and higher order justification. Anton and Bertrand could both have the 
same independent evidence for an evidential proposition, yet Anton believes a 
correct evidential proposition and Bertrand a false one. So, the most promising 
view would claim that when S correctly grasps e, then <e supports p to degree n> is 
known by S on the basis of her grasp of e. If this is right, then the underlying 
assumption is that the following evidential supporting relation holds:  
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(E1) When e supports p to degree n, then e supports <e supports p to 
degree n> to a degree high enough for knowledge. 
 
Surely, we might question the prima facie plausibility of (E1). Why should evidence 
about some mundane state of affairs (say evidence about the whereabouts of my 
car keys) also be evidence for the truth of evidential propositions? Moreover, note 
that (E1) threatens to lead to a regress. Consider the iterated epistemic 
proposition implied in (E1), that is, the evidential proposition expressing the 
relation between e and the higher order proposition supposedly supported by e, <e 
supports p to degree n>:  
 
<e supports <e supports p to degree n> to a degree high enough for 
knowledge> 
 
Consider now again premise (i) and (ii) in the Argument from Recognition. If S gets 
to know the evidential proposition <e supports p to degree n> in virtue of grasping 
e, and e is the evidential support for that proposition, then it seems that by premise 
(i) S should recognize the iterated evidential proposition above, and by (ii) it 
follows that S should know this proposition. Again, we might wonder about the 
evidence upon which S knows the iterated proposition? Once more, it would seem 
that the only plausible answer is would be: e. So, in addition to (E1) we get the 
following:  
 
(E2) When e supports p to degree n, then e supports <e supports <e 
supports p to degree n> to a degree high enough for knowledge> 
 
Again, this looks odd. Can mundane pieces of evidence really be this powerful? 
And, it seems, the list goes on. So, it looks like an infinite regress in levels of 
iterated epistemic propositions that firmly supported by a single piece of evidence. 
 This plays out differently if we assume that knowledge of epistemic 
propositions is a priori. So, on such a view (which I merely consider but do not 
attribute to anyone) when S grasps the import of e, this involves recognizing the 
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epistemic proposition <e supports p to degree n> where this epistemic proposition 
is a priori knowable. Consider the suggestion that S gains a priori knowledge that 
<e supports p to degree n> without even having scrutinized e. This, of course, is 
implausible. A priori knowledge does not come out of nothing. So, a credible 
version of the idea must be that S's a priori knowledge of <e supports p to degree 
n> is based on S's grasp of e. Yet, the relation between e and <e supports p to 
degree n> cannot be an ordinary evidential relation supporting a posteriori 
knowledge. Rather, there must be some other basing relation allowing S to gain a 
priori knowledge of <e supports p to degree n> in virtue of grasping e. This would 
seem to require the general truth of something like:  
 
(E3) When e supports p to degree n then e grounds a priori knowledge 
that <e supports p to degree n> 
 
(E3) does not lead to the same regress as above, and maybe (E3) is plausible in 
other ways too. However, one may wonder why a different regress does not arise. 
The basic claim is that grasping e by forming the appropriate credence in p 
requires knowing the truth of an epistemic proposition such as <e supports p to 
degree n>. Compare to obtaining a priori knowledge that <e supports p to degree 
n> by grasping the evidential import of e. Why doesn't this similarly require 
knowing the truth of <e grounds a priori knowledge of <e supports p to degree 
n>>. If it does, then a new regress arises. 
 To avert these difficulties, one might consider running the argument 
in terms of epistemic justification, rather than knowledge, which is an option Kelly 
mentions in the above quote. One way of interpreting this remark is that 
recognizing the truth of a proposition requires being all-things-considered justified 
 14 
in believing that proposition, rather than knowing it.6 We then get the following 
version of the Argument from Recognition:   
 
(i) When S responds correctly to evidence e by forming credence n in 
p, then S recognizes that <e supports p to degree n> 
 
(ii*) S recognizes that <e supports p to degree n> only if S is all-things-
considered propositionally justified that <e supports p to degree n> 
 
(iii*) So, when S responds correctly to evidence e, S is all-things-
considered propositionally justified that <e supports p to degree n> 
 
Again premise (ii*) is, of course, demanding. As above, we might consider what 
could account for the truth (ii*). How, in the general case, does S become all-things-
considered propositionally justified in epistemic propositions? One option would 
be that S needs independent evidence that make her all-things-considered 
propositionally justified, but for the reasons we have already seen, this would not 
work to support Bottom Up. So, again, the only workable idea would be that 
merely by grasping some body of evidence e one becomes all-things-considered 
propositionally justified in <e supports p to degree n>. This would seem to 
presuppose a general principle along the following lines:    
 
(E4) When e supports p to degree n, then e supports <e supports p to 
degree n> to a degree high enough for all-things-considered 
propositional justification. 
 
                                                      
6  Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this point. It's immaterial for the 
argument whether we read 'justified' as referring to all-things-considered 
propositional justification or something weaker. 
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(E4) probably does not lead to a regress, but it is still difficult to wee what makes 
(E4) plausible. Note that (E4) should not be conflated with the plausible anti-
akratic intuition that when rationally believing p on evidence e, one cannot at the 
same time believe (or be propositionally justified in believing) that e does not 
support p. This anti-akratic intuition does not support the basic idea in Bottom Up, 
which is that correctly grasping first order evidence generate higher order 
evidence. Rather, the anti-akratic intuition backs Top Down - the idea that higher 
order beliefs may destroy first order justification, even when first order 
justification reflects a correct grasp of first order evidence. Note also that, in E4 the 
relation between e and <e supports p to degree n> can hardly be the ordinary one 
that obtains between e and p. Grasping the evidential relation between e and <e 
supports p to degree n> is not like acquiring a posteriori justification in believing p 
on the basis of e. Maybe we should think of (E4) in terms of a priori propositional 
all-things-considered justification based on the grasp of e. 
 Now, even if we accept (E4), this would at most succeed in showing 
one half of Bottom Up. Recall, that Bottom Up asserts that correctly appreciating 
evidence makes one justified in believing the relevant epistemic proposition, but 
also that appreciating evidence correctly makes one justified in believing that one 
has indeed correctly appreciated the evidence. If a version of the Argument from 
Recognition based on (E4) is successful, this would only address the first claim. As 
noted above, knowing or being epistemically justified in believing an epistemic 
proposition does not entail knowing or being epistemically justified in believing 
that one's object level belief correctly reflects one's first order evidence. Hence, to 
get full support of Bottom Up, we would need to underwrite the idea that S's 
grasping e correctly at t makes S at t justified in believing that S has grasped e 
correctly at t. As above, we can ask: by what means, or based on what evidence, 
does S become justified in this belief. Again, the answer has to be: e. For this to be 
true something like the following relation should hold:  
 
e (and S at t has considered e) supports <S at t has correctly 
appreciated e> to a significant degree. 
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Why should evidence about mundane fact in the world also serve as evidence that I 
have appreciated the evidence correctly  when I have? While this is hard to believe, 
I will consider some arguments in favor of this view in the next section. 
3.2 Evidentially transparent cases  
Suppose that a body of evidence entails a proposition, and therefore warrants 
maximal credence in that proposition. Clearly, if the entailment is very complex 
and hard to understand it seems that one's higher order belief that one has 
responded correctly to the first order evidence might not be highly justified, even if 
one has in fact responded correctly. But consider now Kelly's remark that there are 
cases in which 'one's recognition that one's evidence supports a given belief is 
based on an unmediated appreciation of that evidence itself. Thus, in such cases, 
one's evidence not only confirms the belief in question, it also confirms a 
proposition to the effect that it is reasonable for one to hold that belief.' (160)  
 Consider first what I will refer to as evidentially transparent cases, by 
which I mean cases where one's object level belief is based on an unmediated 
appreciation of the evidence pertaining to that belief. Think, for example, of cases 
where one considers a fairly easy mathematical problem and clearly sees what the 
solution is, or perceptual cases where a certain visual input makes some factual 
proposition obvious. Kelly suggests that in evidentially transparent cases it is 
generally the case that one's evidence supports the truth of the relevant evidential 
propositions, and the proposition that one's object level beliefs accurately reflect 
the evidence. If this is right, it may provide some support to Bottom Up. 
 Though plausible at first sight, I nonetheless want to question that the 
appeal to evidential transparency can provide the defense of Bottom Up that we 
are looking for. To see this, suppose that Alf is a complete novice to music. A friend 
of his presses a key on the piano, and he tells Alf that the tone voiced is an F. A 
couple of hours later, someone again hits a key on the piano. Without seeing which 
key is pressed, Alf immediately think to himself: F. Suppose that the tone Alf hear 
this second time indeed an F, and that his spontaneous belief, far from being a 
mere guess, was due to a highly reliable capacity of his. In fact, Alf has perfect 
pitch.  
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 Now, does the fact that Alf accurately appreciate the first order 
evidence, and does so in a way where the first order evidence is transparent to Alf, 
serve to make his higher order belief that his first order belief was indeed an 
accurate response to the evidence epistemically justified? It appears not. It seems 
that Alf would need more background evidence to be justified in his higher order 
belief. In particular, Alf would need additional evidence that he possesses this 
rather rare gift of perfect pitch, and maybe evidence that circumstances are 
normal, and so on.  
 I suggest that we should see Alf's case in the following way. There is a 
set of local evidence e relating to the tone played when Alf's friend strikes a key on 
the piano. When appreciating e, Alf immediately forms the belief that the tone 
played on the piano is an F, and Alf's accurate appreciation of e provides epistemic 
justification for Alf's belief that the tone played is an F. And we can say that e is 
evidentially transparent to Alf in the sense that upon grasping e it is immediately 
obvious to Alf that the tone played is an F. Clearly, however, it does not seem 
plausible to say that e thus construed, or Alf's immediate appreciation of e, also 
contributes to justification of Alf's higher order belief that his first order belief 
correctly reflects e. This is because e is evidence that the tone played is an F, and 
not evidence for the entirely different fact that Alf has perfect pitch. For Alf's 
higher order belief to be justified, Alf's total set of evidence would need to include 
additional evidence for Alf's believing that he is rather reliable in detecting pitch 
under the relevant circumstances.  
 In response to this one might opt for a more internalist construal of 
first order evidence. Suppose that Alf's first order evidence is not the tone played 
as such, but rather Alf's impression as of hearing an F being played, or Alf's 
auditory seeming that the tone played is an F. Construed this way we can plausibly 
say that Alf, upon appreciating his evidence, can form a justified higher order belief 
that his belief accurately reflects his evidence. After all, Alf's evidence is now his 
seeming that the tone played is an F, while Alf's belief is that the tone played is an 
F. Reflecting on this should be enough on its own for Alf to be highly justified in 
believing that his first order belief correctly reflect the first order evidence. So, 
arguably, on this internalist construal correctly appreciating first order evidence 
 18 
makes one justified in higher order beliefs that one's first order beliefs accurately 
reflects the evidence.  
 Clearly, however, this internalist construal of evidence is not what we 
are after. To see this, recall the dialectical role of Bottom Up in the disagreement 
debate. Suppose that Albert responds properly to first order evidence, but 
Bertrand mistakes the force of the first order evidence. The question is whether 
this generates an asymmetry in the degree of justification at the higher order level. 
On the internalist construal of these cases, if both Albert and Bertrand respond in 
accordance with how things seem to them, then their higher order belief that they 
have responded correctly are equally justified, even if Albert is right and Bertrand 
wrong about their first order beliefs. If this is the way that Bottom Up becomes 
true, then it doesn't have the significance we took it to have. 
 One might worry that Alf's music case is very special for two reasons. 
First, it is unusual in the sense that it features a reliable perceptual faculty that 
most of us do not have, and where it therefore might be natural to think that one 
would need additional evidence for thinking that one has this faculty. Second, it is a 
perceptual case, as distinct from a case in which one reasons about the evidential 
import of a body of propositions.  
 Consider an ordinary perceptual case, such as visual perception. 
Surely, there are many features making us justified in believing that our visual 
perception is reliable under normal circumstances. But apart from this, the cases 
seem to be analogous. What makes me justified that a particular visual belief is a 
correct response to a body of visual evidence is not this visual evidence itself, but 
the more general reasons I have to believe that my visual perception is accurate. 
The same, I suggest, holds for cases involving reasoning rather than perception. 
Suppose that e is a body of mathematical evidence strongly suggesting the truth of 
a mathematical proposition p. Suppose that the evidential relation between e and p 
is a non-trivial entailment relation that it takes some effort and mathematical 
aptitude to see, but which is nonetheless transparent for those who invest the 
effort and are sufficiently skilled. Could it be that the mathematical evidence e is 
also evidence for the truth of higher order beliefs such as the belief in <my belief 
that p correctly reflects the evidence e>? It is hard to see why this should be the 
 19 
case. In the ordinary case, where e is some mathematical evidence pondered by a 
subject S, e does not have the appropriate entailment relations to any facts about 
what doxastic states S ought to have. So, if we think of unmediated appreciation of 
mathematical evidence as immediately grasping an entailment relation, it is not as 
if there is an additional entailment relation the grasp of which makes one justified 
in a higher order belief that one's object level belief correctly reflects the evidence.  
 So, in general, it is difficult to see why, when some body of evidence e 
warrants credence n in p, then e is also evidence for <e warrants credence n in p>, 
or the belief that any particular doxastic attitude regarding p is epistemically 
justified.7 This appears also to be true in cases where some evidence e in a vivid 
and immediate way supports p.  
 Yet, when considering simple cases of elementary reasoning, it surely 
seems that there is something right to the idea that Bottom Up may hold in cases of 
evidential transparency. Suppose that Andy, while driving his car, wonders how 
many apples he has in his basket in the back of his car. Andy then remembers for 
sure that he collected 5 green apples and 7 red apples, and that they are the only 
apples in his basket. As he accurately appreciates this evidence, Andy becomes 
rationally justified in his belief that there are 12 apples in his basket. Andy now 
considers his belief that there are 12 apples in the basket. Reflecting on this belief, 
Andy becomes rationally confident that his belief is indeed the proper response to 
the evidence at hand. So, by grasping the evidence correctly, and reflecting on this, 
Andy earns justification for believing that he has responded properly to his 
evidence. So, at some version of Bottom Up must be correct for at least some class 
                                                      
7  There are obviously special cases. Suppose I confidently believe that 
at least one of my beliefs is confidently held. It would seem that the very content of 
this belief makes it reasonable for me to believe that this belief of mine is highly 
justified. This case is special, of course, as it involves a first order beliefs whose 
very content makes it directly evidentially relevant for a certain higher order 
belief. Ordinary cases are not like that, so I set these special cases aside. 
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of evidentially transparent cases involving reasoning. Call this the Argument from 
Simple Reasoning. 
 I will argue, however, that even this case does not lend support to 
Bottom Up. It is clear how Andy's object level belief <there are 12 apples in the 
basket> becomes justified by being based on Andy's proper appreciation of the 
evidence. But the question is how Andy gets from there to being justified in his 
higher order belief that this object level belief correctly reflects his evidence. 
Clearly, Andy knows or justifiably believes <there are 12 apples in the basket>, and 
he knows that if there are 12 apples in the basket, then his belief <there are 12 
apples in the basket> is true. But it doesn't follow from this that Andy knows or is 
justified in believing that his belief <there are 12 apples in the basket> is true. This 
is because, for any proposition a and b, knowing or justifiably believing that a 
entails b in conjunction with the mere truth of the antecedent a, does not entail 
that one knows justifiably believe the consequent b. Here is a way to see exactly 
what is missing in Andy's reasoning:  
 
(1) Andy at t accurately appreciates e by adopting credence n in p 
 
(2) Andy knows that (1) entails that his higher order belief in <S at t 
accurately appreciates e by adopting credence n in p> is true.  
 
(3) Transmission of justification across known entailments. For all 
propositions a and b and agents S: if S is justified in believing a, and S 
knows that a entails b, then S is justified in believing b. 
 
(4) From (1), (2), (3): At t, Andy is justified in his higher order belief 
in <that Andy at t accurately appreciates e by adopting credence n in 
p>.  
 
We can grant that premise (1) is true in virtue of how the case is described. Surely 
premise (2) in the argument is plausible, and let us for the sake of argument accept 
premise (3) also, though a fully plausible transmission principle would need a 
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number of qualifications. Yet, as it stands, the argument is not valid, and the reason 
should be clear. For the argument to be valid it is not enough that (1) is true; Andy 
also needs to be justified in believing premise (1) - this is what the transmission 
principle in (3) requires. So, for desired conclusion (4) to follow, we need not the 
truth of (1), but rather the truth of  
 
(1*) Andy at t is justified in believing that he at t accurately 
appreciates e by adopting credence n in p. 
 
But clearly, (1*) is controversial in this context. While it is clear that Andy's correct 
appreciation of his evidence makes him justified in believing <there are 12 apples 
in the basket>, it not obvious that Andy's correct appreciation of that same 
evidence makes him justified in believing that he has correctly appreciated this 
evidence. But this is what the argument requires, if it is to be based on the 
transmission principle in premise (3). 
 I have argued that it is far from clear that evidentially transparent 
cases underwrite Bottom Up. But consider now what we might call evidentially 
super-transparent cases. By this I mean cases where S's immediate appreciation of 
first order evidence e makes obvious an epistemic proposition concerning the 
extent to which e evidence supports p, and where e is also is evidence that for S's 
higher order belief that her first order belief regarding p correctly reflects e.8 
Clearly, Bottom Up, or a version of it, holds for super-transparent cases, as this is 
simply a matter of how they are defined. Now, this shifts the question to whether 
our actual evidential situation often of ever involves evidentially super-
transparency. I don't think that it is obvious at all that there are many super-
transparent cases, or perhaps any at all. In part this is for the reasons mentioned 
earlier: in general, it is hard to make sense of the idea that when e supports p to 
                                                      
8  I read Kelly's remark above as asserting a claim about evidentially 
transparent cases. But clearly, one might also read him as asserting the existence 
of evidentially super-transparent cases. 
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degree n then e supports < e supports p to degree n>, and the idea that evidence e 
can support both a belief, and the higher order stance that one has appreciated e 
correctly. 
 Let me conclude this section by addressing two worries. First, the 
format for epistemic propositions that I have used throughout (expressed by 'e 
supports p to degree n') suggests that beliefs in epistemic propositions are fine-
grained. Surely, fine-grainedness might pose an independent problem for how we 
might become highly justified in such beliefs. Seeing your scarf makes me justified 
in believing that your scarf is blue, but not justified in believing that is has some 
very specific shade of blue that I can hardly distinguish from other shades. If might 
be thought that the challenges I have raised for Bottom Up depends on epistemic 
propositions being fine-grained.9 In response to this, note that the arguments in 
the paper do not make use of the intuitively attractive idea that it would be difficult 
to be highly confident about the truth of a fine-grained epistemic proposition. The 
recurring problem is that it is difficult to make sense of the idea that appreciating 
object level evidence contributes to higher order justification in the way that 
Bottom Up requires. 
 The second worry is that while I may have shown that first order 
accuracy does not confer doxastic justification to higher order beliefs, it still yields 
propositional justification. I assume that doxastic justification concerns the 
epistemic justification of one's actual doxastic states, whatever it exactly means for 
a doxastic state to be epistemically justified. Propositional justification, by 
contrast, concerns what one would be doxastically justified in believing if one were 
sufficiently rational, attended to one's evidence, and formed the appropriate 
beliefs on the basis of that evidence. So, roughly, a subject S is propositionally 
justified with respect to a proposition p if and only if S possesses a body of 
evidence e, such that if S properly grasped e and based her belief that p on e, then S 
would be doxastically justified in her belief that p. There are, of course, many 
questions of the detailed interpretation of this. I suggest, however, that if what I 
                                                      
9  Thanks to a reviewer for bring up this issue. 
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have argued is correct, then we should reject the idea that first order accuracy 
constitute evidence making higher order beliefs propositionally justified. It is not 
as if were subjects only to focus on the first order evidence available to them, or 
were they a little smarter, then they would tend to become more doxastically 
justified in their higher order beliefs whenever and because they appreciate their 
first order evidence correctly. Rather, if what I have argued is correct, there are no 
evidential routes from first order accuracy to increased justification of higher 
order belief, so first order accuracy makes us neither doxastically nor 
propositionally more justified in our higher order beliefs.   
4. Asymmetric epistemic push 
If what I have argued so far is correct we should reject Bottom Up. If we still accept 
Top Down - the idea that justified higher order beliefs can have a significant impact 
on the justification of first order belief - then there seems to be a significant 
asymmetry in that upward connections and downward connections work in quite 
different ways. If correct, this may have significant implications for the 
epistemology of disagreement and for how Integration is to be understood. In this 
section, I will elaborate on this asymmetric epistemic push. 
 Consider first downwards connections. It is impossible here to discuss 
all types of cases in which one might think that higher order beliefs exerts some 
epistemic influence on the justification of first order belief, so I will focus only on 
the most intuitively compelling. Consider a case modified from Christensen 
(2011): Adrian believes that p upon inspecting a body of mathematical evidence e. 
Now a source that Adrian fully trusts tells him that he has ingested a pill that 
contains a reason-distorting drug. The drug will affect a limited set of his cognitive 
faculties in ways that he cannot detect, and this will lead him to make very severe 
mistakes in his assessment of e, though Adrian will seem to himself to be thinking 
as clearly and discerningly as ever.  
 Intuitively, it seems that Adrian should reduce confidence in his object 
level belief. But why don't first order beliefs and higher order beliefs affect one 
another in both directions? After all, both first order beliefs and higher order 
beliefs figure in the same epistemic subject, and in cases like these they conflict in 
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ways that call for some form of rational adjustment. Why isn't the adjustment 
going in either direction? Surely, Adrian's first order mathematical belief that p 
and the evidence for this belief do not imply or provide direct evidence that Adrian 
has not ingested the reason-distorting drug. But similarly, Adrian's higher order 
belief that he is subject to the drug does not imply or provide evidence that p is 
false. So, why is there a downward connection when there is no upward 
connection?   
 A suggestion is that the asymmetry is related to how we rationally 
reflect about our beliefs. By reflecting about a belief I simply mean wondering and 
reasoning about the truth of the belief and about the implications of the belief for 
one's other beliefs. Intuitively, it seems very clear that if one has a justified 
negative higher order belief and reflects about the implications of this, then one 
should respond by reducing confidence in one's object level belief. So, the case 
above suggests that we should accept something like the following:  
 
(Top Down Rationality) If S has evidence e' that makes her justified in 
believing that her object level belief that p is not a proper response to 
S's object level evidence e for p, then S should modify her rational 
credence in p.  
 
To be sure, (Top Down Rationality) is not uncontroversial and this and related 
ideas have come under attack in recent discussions, though for reasons that are 
unrelated to the problems affecting Bottom Up discussed in this paper.10 
 However, reflecting on an object level belief does not similarly create 
an upward push. Consider a variant of the above case. Beth has considered a body 
of mathematical evidence e, and correctly formed credence n in p. Beth then 
                                                      
10  For discussion and defenses of similar principles, see (Horowitz 2014; 
Sliwa and Horowitz 2015b). For critical discussions of the idea that higher order 
evidence can affect first order rationality, see for example (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; 
Titelbaum 2013; Weatherson ms). 
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happens to overhear a conversation in the philosophy department in which the 
possibility of a reason-distorting drug is mentioned. Beth accepts the idea of a 
reason distorting drug that affects a limited set of her cognitive faculties in ways 
that one cannot detect, and that such a drug would lead her to make very severe 
mistakes in her assessment of e. Beth now starts reflecting about her first order 
belief in p, and specifically wonders if that belief or the evidence e supporting it 
gives her any reason to think that she is not under the influence of a reason 
distorting pill of the kind in question. Clearly, it is very hard to imagine that Beth 
can become justified in her belief that she is not under the influence of a reason-
distorting drug by reflecting about her first order belief, or the evidence 
supporting that belief. There are two basic reasons why this is so. The first is that 
the Beth's first order belief p and her evidence e does not bear on the truth of the 
relevant higher order belief. The second reason is that even if the first order 
evidence did bear on the truth of the higher order belief, there would seem to be 
something question-begging about using the evidence and belief whose very 
propriety is in question as the starting point for a chain of reasoning that 
purportedly shows that Beth is justified in believing that that belief is a proper 
response to the evidence.  
 So, one might suggest that what grounds the asymmetry is this. Even 
when, as in Beth's case, higher order beliefs do not imply anything about the truth 
of first order beliefs, they may have implication for the rationality of holding those 
higher order beliefs. Ordinary first order beliefs, by contrast, do not in similar 
ways have implications for the rationality of higher order beliefs, as there is no 
principle similar to (Top Down Rationality) connecting first order beliefs to the 
rationality of holding higher order beliefs. To be sure, I haven't provided any 
argument for (Top Down Rationality), except for what is involved in presenting a 
couple of intuitively compelling cases, and neither have I responded to the 
criticism of such principles.11 But my aim is the more limited one of pointing to an 
                                                      
11  See earlier footnote. 
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asymmetry suggesting that one can reject Bottom Up while still accepting Top 
Down.  
5. The Fragility of Justification of Higher Order Beliefs 
I now want to consider what I will refer to as the fragility, or lack of robustness, of 
justification of higher order beliefs. Though I rejected this view above, suppose for 
the sake of argument that accurate assessment of first order evidence directly 
contributes to higher order justification in evidentially transparent cases. Clearly, 
not all cases are as transparent as those discussed above, but we might think of 
evidential transparency as a matter of degree, all cases displaying some even if 
only a minimal degree of evidential transparency. 12 We could then accept a graded 
version of Bottom Up according to which when S believes p on the basis of e, and 
this reflects an accurate appreciation of e's evidential import for p, then S's higher 
order belief that S has accurately grasped e is justified proportionally to the degree 
to which e is evidentially transparent to S.  
 I want to focus on what I will refer to as the fragility of higher order 
justification derived from this source. Suppose that a body of evidence e for a 
proposition p is evidentially transparent to me, such that by accurately assessing 
the evidence I generate a significant degree of higher order justification. I then 
receive some defeating evidence e'. Suppose, for example, that I am told by a 
trustworthy source that I have ingested a drug making my assessment of e wildly 
inaccurate, though everything appears normal to me. Or suppose that I come 
across evidence indicating that e doesn't support p after all. Surely, in both cases I 
will thereby have received an undercutting defeater of my object level justification. 
Now, I want to argue that that very same undercutting evidence would also seem 
to defeat my higher order justification in so far as this derives entirely from the 
transparency of my first order evidence. In this sense, my higher order 
justification, when originating in evidential transparency, fails to be robust. 
                                                      
12  Thanks to a reviewer for making this suggestion. 
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 To see this, consider the specifics of evidential transparency and 
defeating evidence. Take evidential transparency first. Assume that S is in an 
evidential transparent situation with respect to e and p. Suppose, moreover, that 
because the situation is evidentially transparent, it further holds that e is evidence 
for <e warrants credence n in p>, and that e is evidence for the truth of S's higher 
order belief that her object level belief in p reflects an accurate assessment of e. 
Consider then undercutting evidence at the object level. Suppose that S's evidence 
e warrants credence n in p. Relative to this, e' is undercutting defeater if either (i) 
e' is evidence for the falsity of <e warrants credence n in p>, or (ii) e' is evidence 
that S's capacity to appreciate e is not reliable in the relevant circumstances. 
 Now, attending to the details of this, we can see that when e' is an 
undercutting defeater of S's first order belief, then e' is also a defeater of S's higher 
order justification derived by the evidential transparency of e. This is because e' 
undercuts either the evidential link between e and <e warrants credence n in p> or 
the evidential link between e and the truth of S's belief that her assessment of e is 
accurate. In other words: when e' undercuts first order justification by indicating 
the falsity of <e is evidence for p>, then e' also undercuts higher order justification 
by indicating the falsity of <e is evidence that <e is evidence for p>>, which is 
precisely what we assumed to be true of evidentially transparent cases. Similarly, 
if e' undercuts justification of first order belief by indicating that S's capacity to 
asses e is not reliable, then e' also indicates that e is not good evidence for it being 
true that S's capacity to assess e is reliable in the circumstances, again a relation 
that we now suppose to hold in evidentially transparent cases. So it seems that 
when one gathers undercutting defeating evidence for first order evidence, then 
one thereby gets evidence undercutting the higher order justification that one 
might receive through evidential transparency of that first order evidence. As I 
said, this is a sense in which higher order justification is fragile. 
 I now want to suggest an implication of this for disagreement cases. It 
will be helpful first to consider a simpler case. Suppose that Aron is highly 
confident that p on the basis of e. Aron then encounters additional rebutting and 
undermining evidence, that is, evidence that his object level belief that p is false, or 
evidence that his object level belief is based on a process that is unreliable or in 
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some way flawed. Now, as it happens, Aron has a very solidly justified higher order 
belief his first order beliefs almost always accurately reflect the evidence in these 
types of cases. Assume, for example, that Aron's ability to understand and evaluate 
the type of evidence in question has been thoroughly tested, and that it has turned 
out that Aron has an outstanding and highly reliable ability to assess evidence 
accurately in these cases, and that Aron knows this. It seems natural to assume 
that Aron's highly justified higher order belief can defeat the object level defeaters 
he encounters, and when it does, it is rational for Aron to retain his high 
confidence that p. 
 Suppose now that Albert and Bertrand consider some evidence e 
independently of one another. Assume that their cases are evidentially 
transparent. It turns out that, upon considering the evidence Albert firmly believes 
p, whereas Bertrand rejects p. Assume that Albert is right: p is true, and e does 
indeed support high confidence in p. Given what we have assumed about evidential 
transparency, since Albert appreciates e correctly and his situation is evidentially 
transparent, this tend to contribute to his higher order justification, whereas this is 
not true for Bertrand. So, Albert and Bertrand are not on a par on the higher order 
level. Assume next that they discover the disagreement they have with one 
another. It might seem that Albert and Bertrand's situations are now asymmetrical, 
since Albert has correctly appreciated the force of e, but Bertrand has not. So, the 
asymmetry at the first order level is reflected by an asymmetry at the higher order 
level. If this were true, then Albert's situation would be like Aron's - Albert's high 
degree of higher order justification would entitle him to dismiss the evidence 
constituted by his disagreement with Bertrand, whereas Bertrand would not be 
similarly entitled.  
 However, if what I have argued above is correct, we might deny that 
the asymmetry at the higher order level remains in full force after the 
disagreement is disclosed. The reason is that the disagreement is evidence of some 
weight for Albert that his first order process might be defective in some way, 
either because e doesn't support p to the extent that Albert's confidence requires, 
or because Albert might have made a mistake in assessing the evidence. I argued 
that evidence that tend to defeat the justification of first order belief also tends to 
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defeat higher order justification regarding that belief, when the higher order 
justification derives from evidential transparency. If this is correct, then Albert's 
higher order justification will be affected by the disagreement. Even if Albert's 
higher order belief is more justified than Bertrand's prior to disclosing their 
disagreement, this might change when they learn of their disagreement. If correct, 
Albert may no longer be in a position like Aron's, whose high degree of justification 
of a higher order belief entitles him to dismiss incoming first order defeating 
evidence.13 
 I have argued that higher order justification may be defeated by first 
order defeaters when it depends on first order evidence. Compare to higher order 
justification that is due to track record evidence. A general form of track record 
evidence appeals to normal circumstances. In so far as we can assume that 
circumstances are normal and our cognition functions properly, we have some 
evidence suggesting that our beliefs are accurate responses to the evidence. A 
more demanding form of track record evidence appeals to specific facts about 
more finely individuated belief-forming processes. I may know that a belief of mine 
is formed in circumstances C by a particular process M, and have independent 
evidence that M tends to respond very accurately to the evidence in those 
circumstances. Both forms of track record evidence are independent of first order 
accuracy in a particular case, and for this reason they do not underwrite Bottom 
Up. However, for exactly that very same reason higher order justification deriving 
                                                      
13  This argument presupposes that disagreement is a first order 
defeater, a claim that some might reject. My impression, though, is that most 
people do accept that evidence of disagreement has the form suited for a first 
order defeater. What they disagree about is whether this defeater is then itself 
defeated or otherwise upset by other features, which might be asymmetrical in 
various disagreement cases. One such asymmetrical defeater-defeater could be 
differences in degrees of higher order justification. My claim is that this particular 
claim is not plausible if differences in higher order justification are held to be due 
to evidential transparency. 
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from track record evidence is more robust in certain respects. To see this, suppose 
S has solid independent evidence e* for her general capacity to assess evidence 
correctly in a particular type of situation. S is now in that type of situation, 
considers some body of evidence e which she takes to support p do degree n. 
Suppose now that S receives some new bits of evidence e' indicating either that <e 
warrants p to degree n> is false, or that S is not capable of assessing the evidence 
accurately in the particular case. S's situation is now that she has some evidence e* 
indicating that she is capable of assessing e correctly, and some evidence e' 
indicating that she is not. The balance of these two conflicting bodies of evidence 
determines her justification of her higher order belief. However, it is not that e' 
undercuts e*, like what we saw above in the case above assuming that higher order 
beliefs were justified by evidential transparency. Rather, this new evidence e' is a 
rebutting defeater relative to e*. So, evidence of first order failure provided by 
cases of disagreement does not undercut higher order justification that depends on 
track record evidence in the way that it undercuts higher order justification that 
depends on evidential transparency. In that sense, track record evidence is more 
robust, though of course even such evidence can be overridden. 
 Before concluding the paper, I want to address the general worry that 
much of what I have argued depend on Independence, or related controversial 
ideas that one is rationally required to bracket certain forms of evidence.14 As 
stated by Christensen, Independence is the following principle: 
 
‘In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief 
about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own 
belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the 
reasoning behind my initial belief about P.’ (Christensen 2011) 
 
As it has often been pointed out, Independence seems implausible for a variety of 
reasons. Independence seems to commit agents to simply ignore their first order 
                                                      
14  Thanks to a reviewer for bringing up this worry. 
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evidence in cases of disagreement, and may also be implausible in cases involving 
high degrees of rational certainty, or when one's beliefs depend on a wide range of 
other beliefs that a simultaneous subject to disagreement (cf. (Lackey 2010; Sosa 
2010; Kelly 2013). It might therefore be considered a weakness if the arguments 
above somehow relied on Independence, or similar requirements that evidence be 
bracketed. 
 In response to this, note that the reasons for rejecting Bottom Up 
advanced in section 3 concerned the difficulty of establishing appropriate relations 
between correct appreciation of object level evidence and higher order beliefs. The 
asymmetry discussed in section 4 was suggested to depend on (Top Down 
Rationality). One might worry that (Top Down Rationality) actually commits to 
Independence. But clearly it does not. (Top Down Rationality) says that if one has 
evidence suggesting the impropriety of a first order belief, then one should modify 
ones rational credence in that belief. This does not commit to the antecedent being 
true in cases of disagreement. Neither does (Top Down Rationality) say anything 
about bracketing. Another worry might be that the arguments that there are no 
reasoning principles similar to (Top Down Rationality) depend on Independence. 
But this worry is unfounded, as this rejection was based on two ideas not 
committing to Independence. The first idea was that there generally is evidential 
import of first order evidence on the truth of higher order belief. The second idea 
was that if you believe p on the basis of e, and wonder whether your belief 
correctly reflects the evidence, you cannot reason your way to an answer by 
simply repeating to yourself that you believe p on the basis of e. This is, of course, a 
sort of bracketing, but it is much more limited and circumscribed than 
Independence, and it doesn't commit to the implausible implications of 
Independence. Finally, one might be concerned that the idea that higher order 
justification may be fragile again depends on Independence, or similar 
controversial assumptions about bracketing. But here the argument was the quite 
specific observation that evidence undercutting first order justification also 
constitute evidence undercutting higher order justification in the special 
circumstance assumed to hold in evidentially transparent cases: that the 
justification of higher order belief depend on correct appreciation of first order 
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evidence. This specific argument does not depend on Independence or 
controversial ideas of bracketing. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Let me conclude by summarizing the main findings. I have argue that we should 
reject Bottom Up as it is difficult to explain how first order accuracy could bring 
about higher order justification. These problems with Bottom Up leave Top Down 
unaffected. Thus, we should reject Bottom Up, but we might still accept Top Down. 
There might be a general asymmetry in the way that object level and higher order 
levels affect one another. Object level beliefs accurately reflecting the evidence do 
not in any clear and convincing way impact the degree of justification of positive 
higher order beliefs. For all this, negative higher order beliefs can still significantly 
impact the justification of object level beliefs.  
 Of course, our higher order beliefs might arise and be justified in a 
variety of ways. Often our higher order beliefs arise from our spontaneous 
inclination to form positive higher beliefs as a complement of confidently held first 
order belief. This process itself does not provide higher order beliefs with any high 
level of justification. Though I have argued that this is implausible, someone might 
insist that at least in evidentially transparent cases, higher order beliefs earn some 
degree of epistemic justification from first order evidence being evidentially 
transparent. Even if this were true, higher order justification obtained in this way 
would not be very robust as object level undercutting evidence would generally 
also be higher order undercutting evidence. When higher order justification 
depends on track record evidence, it is more robust vis-à-vis the defeating effect of 
object level defeating evidence, and this is because track record evidence justifying 
positive higher order belief does not depend on object level evidence. However, 
just how robust track record evidence is seems to depend on details of the nature 
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